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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-771
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OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, PETITIONER v.
CHICKASAW NATION
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the tenth circuit
[June 14, 1995]

  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
  This case concerns the taxing authority of the State of
Oklahoma over the Chickasaw Nation (Tribe) and its
members.  We take up two questions: (1) May Okla-
homa impose its motor fuels excise tax upon fuel sold by
Chickasaw Nation retail stores on tribal trust land; (2)
May Oklahoma impose its income tax upon members of
the Chickasaw Nation who are employed by the Tribe
but who reside in the State outside Indian country.
  We hold that Oklahoma may not apply its motor fuels
tax, as currently designed, to fuel sold by the Tribe in
Indian country.  In so holding, we adhere to settled law:
when Congress does not instruct otherwise, a State's
excise tax is unenforceable if its legal incidence falls on
a Tribe or its members for sales made within Indian
country.  We further hold, however, that Oklahoma may
tax the income (including wages from tribal employment)
of all persons, Indian and non-Indian alike, residing in
the State outside Indian country.  The Treaty between
the United States and the Tribe, which guarantees the
Tribe and its members that -no Territory or State shall
ever have a right to pass laws for the government of-
the Chickasaw Nation, does not displace the rule,
accepted interstate and internationally, that a sovereign
may tax the entire income of its residents.

                            I
  The Chickasaw Nation, a federally recognized Indian
tribe, commenced this civil action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, to
stop the State of Oklahoma from enforcing several state
taxes against the Tribe and its members.  Pertinent
here, the District Court, ruling on cross-motions for
summary judgment, held for the State on the motor
fuels tax imposition and largely for the Tribe on the
income tax issue.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled for the Tribe and its members on both
issues: it held that the State may not apply the motor
fuels tax to fuel sold by the Tribe's retail stores, and,
further, that the State may not tax the wages of
members of the Chickasaw Nation who work for the
Tribe, even if they reside outside Indian country.  31 F.
3d 964 (1994).
  Concerning the motor fuels tax, the Tenth Circuit
disapproved the District Court's -balancing of the
respective tribal and state interests- approach.  Id., at
972.  The legal incidence of the tax, the Court of
Appeals ruled, is the key concept.  That incidence, the
Tenth Circuit determined, falls directly on fuel retail-
ers-here, on the Tribe, due to its operation of two
convenience stores that sell fuel to tribal members and
other persons.  Oklahoma's imposition of its fuels tax on
the Tribe as retailer, the Court of Appeals concluded,
-conflicts with . . . the traditional scope of Indian
sovereign authority.-  Ibid.  Because the State asserted
no congressional authorization for its exaction, the Tenth
Circuit declared the fuels tax preempted.
  Oklahoma's income tax, in the Court of Appeals' view,
could not be applied to any tribal member employed by
the Tribe; residence, the Tenth Circuit said, was
-simply not relevant to [its] determination.-  Id., at 979.
The Court of Appeals relied on the provision of the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, Art. IV,
7 Stat. 333, 334, that -no Territory or State shall ever
have a right to pass laws for the government of the
[Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descen-
dants.-  To this treaty language, the Tenth Circuit
applied -the general rule that `[d]oubtful expressions are
to be resolved in favor of' the Indians.-  31 F. 3d, at 978
(quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U. S. 164, 174 (1973)).  The Court of Appeals also noted
that it had endeavored to -rea[d] the treaty as the
Indians [who signed it] would have understood it.-  31
F. 3d, at 979.
  We granted the State's petition for certiorari, 513
U. S. ___ (1995), and now (1) affirm the Court of
Appeals' judgment as to the motor fuels tax, and (2)
reverse that judgment as to the income tax applied to
earnings of tribal members who work for the Tribe but
reside in the State outside Indian country.

                           II
  The Tribe contends, and the Tenth Circuit held, that
Oklahoma's fuels tax is levied on retailers, not on
distributors or consumers.  The respect due to the
Chickasaw Nation's sovereignty, the Tribe maintains,
means Oklahoma-absent congressional permission-may
not collect its tax for fuel supplied to and sold by the
Tribe at its convenience stores.  In support of the tax
immunity it asserts, the Tribe recalls our reaffirmations
to this effect:  -The Constitution vests the Federal
Government with exclusive authority over relations with
Indian tribes . . . , and in recognition of the sovereignty
retained by Indian tribes even after formation of the
United States, Indian tribes and individuals generally
are exempt from state taxation within their own terri-
tory.-  Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 764
(1985); see also, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U. S. 145, 148 (1973).
  In response, Oklahoma urges that Indian tribes and
their members are not inevitably but only -`generally'-
immune from state taxation.  Brief for Petitioner 19
(quoting Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S., at 764).  At least as
to some aspects of state taxation, Oklahoma asserts, an
approach -balancing the state and tribal interests- is in
order.  Brief for Petitioner 17.  Even if the legal inci-
dence of the fuels tax falls on the Tribe (as retailer),
Oklahoma concludes, tax immunity should be disallowed
here because -the state interest supporting the levy is
compelling, . . . the tribal interest is insubstantial, and
. . . the state tax would have no effect on `tribal gover-
nance and self-determination.'- Id., at 22 (emphasis in
original).
  In the alternative, Oklahoma argues that the Court of
Appeals -erred in holding that the legal incidence of the
fuel tax falls on the retailer.- Id., at 10.  Moreover, the
State newly contends, even if the fuels tax otherwise
would be impermissible, Congress, in the 1936 Hayden-
Cartwright Act, 4 U. S. C. 104, expressly permitted
state taxation of reservation activity of this type.  Brief
for Petitioner 23-24.
  We set out first our reason for refusing to entertain at
this late date Oklahoma's argument that the Hayden-
Cartwright Act expressly permits state levies on motor
fuels sold on Indian reservations.  We then explain why
we agree with the Tenth Circuit on the Tribe's exemp-
tion from Oklahoma's fuels tax.

                            A
  On brief, the State points out-for the first time in
this litigation-that the Hayden-Cartwright Act, 4
U. S. C. 104, expressly authorizes States to tax motor
fuel sales on -United States military or other reserva-
tions.-  104(a).  The Act's word -reservations,- Okla-
homa maintains, encompasses Indian reservations.  Brief
for Petitioner 23-24.  We decline to address this ques-
tion of statutory interpretation.  The State made no
reference to the Hayden-Cartwright Act in the courts of
first and second instance.  And even though the Court
of Appeals flagged the Act's possible relevance, Okla-
homa did not mention this 1936 legislation in its
petition for certiorari.  Nor is Oklahoma's newly discov-
ered claim of vintage legislative authorization -fairly
included- in the question the State tendered for our
review: -Whether principles of federal pre-emption or
Indian sovereignty preclude a State from imposing a tax
on motor fuel sold by an Indian tribe . . . . ?-  Pet. for
Cert. (i).  As a court of review, not one of first view, we
will entertain issues withheld until merits briefing -`only
in the most exceptional cases.'-  Yee v. Escondido, 503
U. S. 519, 535 (1992) (citation omitted).  This case does
not fit that bill.

                            B
  Assuming, then, that Congress has not expressly
authorized the imposition of Oklahoma's fuels tax on
fuel sold by the Tribe, we must decide if the State's
exaction is nonetheless permitted.  Oklahoma asks us to
make the determination by weighing the relevant state
and tribal interests, and urges that the balance tilts in
its favor.  Oklahoma emphasizes that the fuel sold is
used -almost exclusively on state roads,- imposing -very
substantial costs on the State-but no burden at all on
the Tribe.-  Brief for Petitioner 9.  The State also
stresses that -the levy does not reach any value generat-
ed by the Tribe on Indian land,- id., at 10; i.e., the fuel
is not produced or refined in Indian country, and is
often sold to outsiders.
  We have balanced federal, state, and tribal interests
in diverse contexts, notably, in assessing state regulation
that does not involve taxation, see, e.g., California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202,
216-217 (1987) (balancing interests affected by State's
attempt to regulate on-reservation high-stakes bingo
operation), and state attempts to compel Indians to
collect and remit taxes actually imposed on non-Indians.
See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463, 483
(1976) (balancing interests affected by State's attempt to
require tribal sellers to collect cigarette tax on non-
Indians; precedent about state taxation of Indians is not
controlling because -this [collection] burden is not,
strictly speaking, a tax at all-).
  But when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on
an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian country,
rather than on non-Indians, we have employed, instead
of a balancing inquiry, -a more categorical approach:
`[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it,' we have held, a State is without power to
tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.-  County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 258 (1992) (citation omitted).
Taking this categorical approach, we have held unen-
forceable a number of state taxes whose legal incidence
rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian
country.  See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S.
373 (1976) (tax on Indian-owned personal property
situated in Indian country); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 165-166 (1973) (tax
on income earned on reservation by tribal members
residing on reservation).
  The initial and frequently dispositive question in
Indian tax cases, therefore, is who bears the legal
incidence of a tax.  If the legal incidence of an excise
tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made
inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent
clear congressional authorization.  See, e.g., Moe, 425
U. S., at 475-481 (Montana's cigarette sales tax imposed
on retail consumers could not be applied to on-reserva-
tion -smoke shop- sales to tribal members).  But if the
legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no
categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax; if the
balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the
State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State
may impose its levy, see Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 154-157
(1980), and may place on a tribe or tribal members
-minimal burdens- in collecting the toll.  Department of
Taxation and Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., 512 U. S., ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 12).  Thus,
the inquiry proper here is whether the legal incidence of
Oklahoma's fuels tax rests on the Tribe (as retailer), or
on some other transactors-here, the wholesalers who
sell to the Tribe or the consumers who buy from the
Tribe.
  Judicial focus on legal incidence in lieu of a more
venturesome approach accords due deference to the lead
role of Congress in evaluating state taxation as it bears
on Indian tribes and tribal members.  See Yakima, 502
U. S., at 267.  The State complains, however, that the
legal incidence of a tax -`has no relationship to economic
realities.'-  Brief for Petitioner 30 (quoting Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977)).
But our focus on a tax's legal incidence accommodates
the reality that tax administration requires predicta-
bility.  The factors that would enter into an inquiry of
the kind the State urges are daunting.  If we were to
make -economic reality- our guide, we might be obliged
to consider, for example, how completely retailers can
pass along tax increases without sacrificing sales
volume-a complicated matter dependent on the charac-
teristics of the market for the relevant product.  Cf.
Yakima, 502 U. S., at 267-268 (categorical approach
safeguards against risk of litigation that could -engulf
the States' annual assessment and taxation process, with
the validity of each levy dependent upon a multiplicity
of factors that vary from year to year, and from parcel
to parcel-).
  By contrast, a -legal incidence- test, as 11 States with
large Indian populations have informed us, -provide[s] a
reasonably bright-line standard which, from a tax
administration perspective, responds to the need for
substantial certainty as to the permissible scope of state
taxation authority.-  Brief for South Dakota et al. as
Amici Curiae 2.  And if a State is unable to enforce a
tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on
Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to
amend its law to shift the tax's legal incidence.  So, in
this case, the State recognizes and the Tribe agrees that
Oklahoma could accomplish what it here seeks -by
declaring the tax to fall on the consumer and directing
the Tribe to collect and remit the levy.-  Pet. for Cert.
17; see Brief for Respondent 10-13.

                            C
  The State also argues that, even if legal incidence is
key, the Tenth Circuit erred in holding that the fuels
tax's legal incidence rests on the retailer (here, the
Tribe).  We consider the Court of Appeal's ruling on this
point altogether reasonable, and therefore uphold it.
See, e.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314, n. 8
(1983) (noting -our practice to accept a reasonable
construction of state law by the court of appeals-).
  The Oklahoma legislation does not expressly identify
who bears the tax's legal incidence-distributors,
retailers, or consumers; nor does it contain a -pass
through- provision, requiring distributors and retailers
to pass on the tax's cost to consumers.  Cf. Moe, 424
U. S., at 482 (statute at issue provided that Montana
cigarette tax -shall be conclusively presumed to be [a]
direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the
purpose of convenience and facility only-).
  In the absence of such dispositive language, the
question is one of -fair interpretation of the taxing
statute as written and applied.-  California Bd. of
Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe, 474 U. S. 9, 11 (1985)
(per curiam).  Oklahoma's law requires fuel distributors
to -remit- the amount of tax due to the Tax Commis-
sion; crucially, the statute describes this remittal by the
distributor as -on behalf of a licensed retailer.-  Okla.
Stat., Tit. 68, 505(C) (1991) (emphasis added).  The
inference that the tax obligation is legally the retailer's,
not the distributor's, is supported by the prescriptions
that sales between distributors are exempt from taxa-
tion, 507, but sales from a distributor to a retailer are
subject to taxation.  505(E).  Further, if the distributor
remits taxes it subsequently is unable to collect from the
retailer, the distributor may deduct the uncollected
amount from its future payments to the Tax Commis-
sion.  505(C).  The distributor, then, -is no more than
a transmittal agent for the taxes imposed on the
retailer.-  31 F. 3d, at 971.  And for their services as
-agent of the state for [tax] collection,- distributors
retain a small portion of the taxes they collect.  506(a).
  The fuels tax law contains no comparable indication
that retailers are simply collection agents for taxes
ultimately imposed on consumers.  No provision sets off
the retailer's liability when consumers fail to make pay-
ments due; neither are retailers compensated for their
tax collection efforts.  And the tax imposed when a
distributor sells fuel to a retailer applies whether or not
the fuel is ever purchased by a consumer.  See, e.g.,
502 (-There is hereby levied an excise tax . . . upon the
sale of each and every gallon of gasoline sold, or stored
and distributed, or withdrawn from storage . . . .-).
Finally, Oklahoma's law imposes no liability of any kind
on a consumer for purchasing, possessing, or using
untaxed fuel; in contrast, the legislation makes it
unlawful for distributors or retailers -to sell or offer for
sale in this state, motor fuel or diesel fuel while delin-
quent in the payment of any excise tax due the state.-
505(C).
  As the Court of Appeals fairly and reasonably con-
cluded: -[T]he import of the language and the structure
of the fuel tax statutes is that the distributor collects
the tax from the retail purchaser of the fuel-; the -motor
fuel taxes are legally imposed on the retailer rather
than on the distributor or the consumer.-  31 F. 3d, at
971-972.

                           III
  Regarding Oklahoma's income tax, the Court of
Appeals declared that the State may not tax the wages
of members of the Chickasaw Nation who work for the
Tribe, including members who reside in Oklahoma
outside Indian country.
  The holding on tribal members who live in the State
outside Indian country runs up against a well estab-
lished principle of interstate and international taxa-
tion-namely, that a jurisdiction, such as Oklahoma,
may tax all the income of its residents, even income
earned outside the taxing jurisdiction:
-That the receipt of income by a resident of the
territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable event
is universally recognized.  Domicil itself affords a
basis for such taxation.  Enjoyment of the privileges
of residence in the state and the attendant right to
invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable
from responsibility for sharing the costs of govern-
ment . . . .  These are rights and privileges which
attach to domicil within the state. . . .  Neither the
privilege nor the burden is affected by the character
of the source from which the income is derived.-
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308,
312-313 (1937).
This -general principl[e] . . . ha[s] international accep-
tance.-  American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax
Project: International Aspects of United States Income
Taxation 4, 6 (1987); see, e.g., C. Cretton, Expatriate
Tax Manual 1 (2d ed. 1991) (-An individual who is
resident in the UK is subject to income tax on all his
sources of income, worldwide.-).  It has been applied
both to the States, e.g., Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37,
57 (1920); see 2 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State
Taxation 20.04, p. 20-13 (1992), and to the Federal
Government.  E.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47, 56 (1924);
see 1 J. Isenbergh, International Taxation 45-56
(1990).
  The Tribe seeks to block the State from exercising its
ordinary prerogative to tax the income of every resident;
in particular, the Tribe seeks to shelter from state
taxation the income of tribal members who live in
Oklahoma outside Indian country but work for the Tribe
on tribal lands.  For the exception the Tribe would
carve out of the State's taxing authority, the Tribe gains
no support from the rule that Indians and Indian tribes
are generally immune from state taxation, McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973), as
this principle does not operate outside Indian country.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508
U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 8-10).
  Notably, the Tribe has not asserted here, or before the
Court of Appeals, that the State's tax infringes on tribal
self-governance.  See Brief in Opposition 9-10 (-in-
fringement- question is not presented to this Court);
Brief for Respondent 42, n. 37; see also Sac and Fox,
508 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (reserving question
-whether the Tribe's right to self-governance could
operate independently of its territorial jurisdiction to
pre-empt the State's ability to tax income earned from
work performed for the Tribe itself when the employee
does not reside in Indian country-).
  Instead, the Tribe relies on the argument that Okla-
homa's levy impairs rights granted or reserved by
federal law.  See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U. S. 145, 148-149 (1973) (-[E]xpress federal law to the
contrary- overrides the general rule that -Indians going
beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held
subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applica-
ble to all citizens of the State.-).  The Tribe invokes the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, Art. IV,
7 Stat. 333-334, which provides in pertinent part:
-The Government and people of the United States
are hereby obliged to secure to the said [Chicka-
saw] Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and
government of all the persons and property that
may be within their limits west, so that no Territory
or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the
government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People
and their descendants . . . but the U. S. shall
forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and
against, all [such] laws . . . .-
According to the Tribe, the State's income tax, when
imposed on tribal members employed by the Tribe, is a
law -for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of
Red People and their descendants,- and it is immaterial
that these -descendants- live outside Indian country.
  In evaluating this argument, we are mindful that
-treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians.-  County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U. S. 226, 247 (1985).  But liberal construction
cannot save the Tribe's claim, which founders on a clear
geographic limit in the Treaty.  By its terms, the Treaty
applies only to persons and property -within [the
Nation's] limits.-  We comprehend this Treaty language
to provide for the Tribe's sovereignty within Indian
country.  We do not read the Treaty as conferring super-
sovereign authority to interfere with another juris-
diction's sovereign right to tax income, from all sources,
of those who choose to live within that jurisdiction's
limits.
  The Tribe and the United States further urge us to
read the Treaty in accord with the repudiated view that
an income tax imposed on government employees should
be treated as a tax on the government.  See Dobbins v.
Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842).  But
see Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466,
480 (1939) (-The theory, which once won a qualified
approval, that a tax on income is legally or economically
a tax on its source, is no longer tenable . . . .-).  Under
this view, a tax on tribal members employed by the
Tribe would be seen as an impermissible tax on the
Tribe itself.
  We doubt the signatories meant to incorporate this
now-defunct view into the Treaty.  They likely gave no
thought to a State's authority to tax the income of tribal
members living in the State's domain, because they did
not expect any members to be there.  On the contrary,
the purpose of the Treaty was to put distance between
the Tribe and the States.  Under the Treaty, the Tribe
moved across the Mississippi River, from its traditional
lands within Mississippi and Alabama to unsettled lands
not then within a State.  See D. Hale & A. Gibson, The
Chickasaw 46-59 (1991).
  Moreover, importing the Dobbins rule into the Treaty
would prove too much.  That dubious doctrine, by typing
taxation of wages earned by tribal employees as taxation
of the Tribe itself, would require an exemption for all
employees of the Tribe-not just tribal members, but
nonmembers as well.  The Court of Appeals rejected
such an extension, see 31 F. 3d, at 975 (-It is settled
that the income tax is imposed on the employee, not the
employer . . . .  Therefore, to the extent that the income
tax is imposed on non-member employees who have no
established claim to tribal ancestry, the tax does not
infringe upon the treaty prohibition.-), and even the
Tribe is not urging this view before us, admitting that
it is -substantially more tenuous.-  Brief for Respondent
47.
                      *     *     *
  For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals as to the motor fuels tax, reverse that
judgment as to the income tax, and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.

                        APPENDIX

            Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek,
               Sept. 27, 1830, Article IV
                     7 Stat. 333-334

The Government and people of the United States are
hereby obliged to secure to the said [Chickasaw] Nation
of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the
persons and property that may be within their limits
west, so that no Territory or State shall ever have a
right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw]
Nation of Red People and their descendants; and that no
part of the land granted them shall ever be embraced in
any Territory or State; but the U. S. shall forever secure
said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all laws
except such as from time to time may be enacted in
their own National Councils, not inconsistent with the
Constitution, Treaties, and Laws of the United States;
and except such as may, and which have been enacted
by Congress, to the extent that Congress under the
Constitution are required to exercise a legislation over
Indian Affairs.  But the [Chickasaws], should this Treaty
be ratified, express a wish that Congress may grant to
the [Chickasaws] the right of punishing by their own
laws, any white man who shall come into their nation,
and infringe any of their national regulations.